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Abstract
This paper examines endogenous cartel formation in the presence of a com-
petition authority. Competition policy makes the most inclusive stable cartels
less inclusive. In particular, small rms that might have been cartel members in
the absence of a competition authority are no longer members. Regarding the
least inclusive stable cartels, competition policy can either increase or decrease
their inclusiveness. Highly inelastic market demand is su¢ cient for the presence
of a competition authority to cause the least inclusive stable cartels to increase
in size.
1 Introduction
Research has extensively explored how competition policy a¤ects whether collusion
is stable and, when it is stable, the price set by cartel members and the cartels
duration. For example, there is a large and growing literature that examines the
impact of corporate leniency programs on whether a cartel forms and what price it
sets if it does form.1 All that analysis, however, has made two restrictive assumptions
about the cartels composition. First, that the cartel is all-inclusive. Second, that
the inclusiveness of the cartel is xed with regards to competition policy. Practice
runs contrary to the rst assumption in that many cartels comprise some, but not
all, rms in a market2 and, with regards to the second assumption, it is natural to
expect that a tougher competition policy could inuence which rms choose to join
a cartel and how inclusive a cartel must be for the cartel to be stable.
The objective of this paper is to explore the impact of competition policy on a
cartels size and composition. In earlier work (Bos and Harrington, 2010), the set of
Maastricht University, School of Business and Economics, Department of Organization &
Strategy. Address: Tongersestraat 53, Maastricht, 6211 LM, The Netherlands. E-mail:
i.bos@maastrichtuniversity.nl.
yUniversity of Pennsylvania, The Wharton School, Department of Business Economics & Public
Policy. Address: 3620 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19102. E-mail: harrij@wharton.upenn.edu.
1For references, see Spagnolo (2008) and Harrington and Chang (2012).
2Examples are in Harrington (2006) and Bos and Harrington (2010) and references cited therein.
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stable cartels was characterized but in the absence of antitrust enforcement. In this
paper, that model is amended to allow for a competition authority that can detect and
convict cartels and, as a consequence, impose nancial penalties and cause the cartel
to shutdown. We also allow for a corporate leniency program so that a cartel member
can receive a reduced penalty in exchange for cooperating with the authorities.
Our main ndings are, for the most part, based on assessing the impact of in-
troducing a competition authority; that is, comparing the set of stable cartels with
antitrust enforcement with the set of stable cartels without antitrust enforcement.
First, we nd that competition policy results in the most inclusive stable cartel being
less inclusive. In particular, small rms are no longer cartel members when there are
competition laws and an authority to enforce them. Second, more severe penalties
cause the size of the most protable cartel to shrink which again suggests that compe-
tition policy is making for less inclusive cartels. Third, antitrust enforcement has an
ambiguous e¤ect on the size of the least inclusive stable cartels. If market demand is
highly inelastic then the least inclusive stable cartels encompass more rms, but there
are other market conditions such that the least inclusive stable cartels involve fewer
rms. Combining these results, we nd that either antitrust enforcement reduces the
range of sizes of stable cartels - as it increases the size of the smallest cartels and
decreases the size of the largest cartels - or it shifts the range of stable cartels down
- making the most and least inclusive cartels less encompassing.
In the next section, the model is introduced. Section 3 establishes equilibrium
cartel behavior, while Section 4 provides the conditions for a cartel to be stable. The
main results of the paper are in Section 5 which characterizes the impact of antitrust
enforcement on the set of stable cartels. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
To explore the impact of competition policy on the inclusiveness of cartels, the
capacity-constrained price-setting repeated game in Bos and Harrington (2010) is
modied to allow for a cartel to be convicted and penalized. Consider an industry
with n  3 rms producing a homogeneous good at common marginal cost c  0.3
Let N  f1; : : : ; ng denote the set of rms. Firm i has a xed production capacity
ki and, without loss of generality, assume k1  k2      kn. Firms have a common
discount factor  2 (0; 1). The setting is one of perfect monitoring so, in any period,
all past prices are common knowledge.
Market demand is given by D (p) which is a twice continuously di¤erentiable and
decreasing function of price. Moreover, D (c) > 0 and monopoly prot, (p  c)D (p),
is strictly concave. The monopoly price pm is dened by: D (pm)+(pm   c)D0 (pm) =
0. In each period, rms simultaneously choose prices from f0; "; : : : ; c  "; c; c+ "; : : :g
and produce to meet demand up to capacity. Results will be derived for " > 0 and
3Given that we are interested in exploring the inclusivity of cartels, it is necessary to assume there
are at least three rms. Furthermore, assumptions made below on capacity imply there must be at
least three rms; for an elaboration, see Bos and Harrington (2010).
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su¢ ciently small.4 Demand of rm i is denoted Di (pi; p i), which depends on its
own price pi and the vector of rivalsprices, p i. As in Bos and Harrington (2010),
three fairly general assumptions are made on rm demand and capacities. In stating
these assumptions, let  (p)  fj : pj = pgdenote the set of rms that price at p and
dene pmin i  min fp1; : : : ; pi 1; pi+1; : : : ; png :
A1 lim!0+ Di
 
pmin i + ; p i

= max
n
D
 
pmin i
 Pj2(pmin i ) kj ; 0o :
A2 If 0 <
P
i2(p)Di (pi; p i) <
P
i2(p) ki then 0 < Di (pi; p i) < ki; 8i 2  (p) :
A3 ki < D (pm) and
P
j 6=i kj  D (c) ; 8i 2 N:
A1 holds for any well-behaved residual demand function, while A2 imposes some
symmetry across rms. The rst part of A3 imposes an upper bound on rm size.
It has the implication that, for prices not exceeding the monopoly price, a rm that
charges a price below all of its rivals is capacity-constrained. The second part of A3
states that any n   1 rms have su¢ cient production capacity to meet competitive
demand. This assumption ensures that the one-shot game has two symmetric Nash
equilibria with prices of c and c + ". Thus, for su¢ ciently small ", static Nash
equilibrium prot is approximately zero.
Firms can potentially enhance their prots through the formation of a price-xing
cartel. Consider a cartel    N with common cartel price p > c+ ". If    N , then
the cartel faces competition from at least one outsider.5 As proven in Lemma 2 in Bos
and Harrington (2010), non-colluding rms optimally set their prices slightly below
the cartel price and produce up to capacity. Residual cartel demand is then given
by D (p)   (K  K ), where K =
P
i2N ki and K  =
P
i2  ki denote, respectively,
industry and cartel capacity. Clearly, collusion is benecial only when the cartel faces
positive demand, which requires D (p)   (K  K ) > 0 or K  > K   D (p). Thus,
a necessary condition for a cartel to be successful is that it controls a su¢ ciently
large part of industry capacity. Under the assumption that cartel prot is allocated
in proportion to capacity, prot of rm i 2   is:6
(p  c) [D (p)  (K  K )]

ki
K 

.
Firms that take part in a cartel become subject to antitrust enforcement. In each
period in which at least one rm sets the collusive price, the antitrust authority dis-
covers cartel   with probability  ( ) 2 [0; 1]. Thus,  () maps from the set of subsets
of N with at least two members into [0; 1] : The absence of antitrust enforcement is
when  () = 0. In the event of an investigation, conviction occurs for sure and results
in the immediate and permanent break-down of the cartel; hence, rms return to a
4While there is no explicit reference made to " in the results of this paper, we draw upon results
in Bos and Harrington (2010) which presume " is su¢ ciently small.
5 refers to strict set inclusion so that  0   00 means  0 is a strict subset of  00.
6A motivation and extensive discussion of this assumption is provided in Bos and Harrington
(2010).
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static Nash equilibrium forever. With probability 1   ( ) there is no investigation
(and thus no chance of conviction) in the current period. Though rms outside of
the cartel benet from the higher prices - indeed, they price just below the collusive
price - it is customary for them to be innocent of violating the law, and are typically
not liable for customer damages. It is then assumed that they are not subject to
penalties though will be harmed with the subsequent fall in prices due to antitrust
enforcement shutting down the cartel.
As stated in A4, cartels with more members are assumed to have a higher prob-
ability of investigation and conviction.
A4 If  0   00 then  ( 0) <  ( 00) ; and if i =2   then limki!0  (  [ fig) >  ( ) :
Thus, the probability of being caught is higher when a cartel adds rms, which strikes
us as a natural assumption. The chances that the competition authority receives a
complaint by a buyer is more likely when more buyers are a¤ected which is the
case when the cartel is more inclusive. If discovery comes from a cartel member
inadvertently revealing information to an uninvolved employee within the rm then
again this is more likely when more people are engaged in collusion which is true
when there are more rms in the cartel.7 A4 also assumes the increase in probability
from adding a rm to the cartel is bounded above zero even if the additional cartel
member is arbitrarily small in terms of capacity (and, as a result, market share). This
condition seems reasonable given that much of the reason why more members makes
detection more likely is that there are more people with knowledge of the cartel and
thus more opportunities for information to leak out, which is non-trivial even when
a rm is very small.8
In case of discovery, a cartel member faces an antitrust penalty that is proportional
to the prot it earned while colluding:
 (p  c) [D (p)  (K  K )]

ki
K 

; (1)
where  > 0 is a penalty multiplier.9 Thus, larger cartel members face a larger
penalty, all else equal. Many jurisdictions have a leniency program that gives cartel
participants the opportunity to turn themselves in in exchange for a reduction of
their penalty. To encompass such a program, assume that if rm i is the rst rm to
7One e¤ect which may work in the other direction is that non-cartel members may provide a
benchmark for determining that there is a cartel. Thus, an all-inclusive cartel could possibly be
more di¢ cult to detect.
8A4 also allows the probability of discovery and conviction to depend on the capacities of the cartel
members though that is not a property that is used for any of our results. What the probability is
not allowed to depend on are the prices and quantities. To our knowledge, the only dynamic model
in which the cartels price behavior a¤ects the likelihood of the cartel paying penalties is Harrington
(2004, 2005).
9This is a natural specication in jurisdictions that have customer damages. While customer
damages are typically calculated in such a way that damages do not generally equal the incremental
prot from collusion, incremental prots are still a good approximation. In jurisdictions where the
primary penalty is government nes then this specication is more problematic because those nes
are often based more on revenue than on prot.
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receive leniency then it pays a penalty equal to the expression in (1) multiplied by
 2 [0; 1].  is a policy parameter and includes the case of no leniency ( = 1) and
full leniency ( = 0). Of course, in response to an investigation, all cartel members
may simultaneously race for leniency in which case it is natural to suppose that each
has an equal chance of receiving it. If leniency is given only to one rm then a rm
can expect to pay the full penalty multiplied by j j 1+j j ; each cartel member has
probability 1j j of receiving leniency and probability
j j 1
j j of not receiving leniency
and paying the full penalty. To allow for such discounts - as well as other programs
that may impact the penalties actually paid - it is assumed that, in response to an
investigation, a cartel member can expect to pay a penalty equal to (1) multiplied
by  ( ) 2 (0; 1]. Hence, the expected penalty that rm i 2   faces prior to learning
whether or not there is an investigation is10
 ( ) ( )  (p  c) [D (p)  (K  K )]

ki
K 

: (2)
It is assumed  ( ) is weakly larger for cartels encompassing more members.
A5 If  0   00 then  ( 0)   ( 00) :
The special case of  ( ) = j j 1+j j obviously satises these conditions.
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3 Cartels Objective and Equilibrium Price
Consider a cartel   with a common cartel price p > c + ". The collusive value for
member i 2  , denoted Vi (p; ), is dened recursively by
Vi (p; ) = (p  c) [D (p)  (K  K )]

ki
K 

  ( ) ( )  (p  c) [D (p)  (K  K )]

ki
K 

+  (1   ( ))Vi (p; ) :
10While the expression in (2) suggests that  ( ) is redundant because only  ( ) ( ) enters,
we will soon present expressions that depend only on  ( ). For example, the expected payo¤ to a
non-cartel member depends only on the probability of the cartel shutting down,  ( ), because it is
not penalized.
11One might ask why leniency would be given in response to an investigation when conviction
is assumed to occur for sure. One reason is that it saves on resources in prosecuting the case.
Alternatively, we could specify  ( ) as the probability of an investigation and introduce ! as the
probability of conviction when there is no leniency program; in that case,  ( )! is the probability
of paying penalties. When there is a leniency program (and presuming that, in response to an
investigation, rms use it),  ( ) can then be interpreted as the probability of paying penalties
multiplied by the fraction of penalties one must pay. Discounts due to leniency would tend to reduce
 ( ) - which is referred to as the Cartel Amnesty e¤ect in Harrington (2008) - and if conviction is
more likely because rms come forward to cooperate then it would tend to cause  ( ) > ! - which
is referred to as the Race to the Courthouse e¤ect in Harrington (2008).
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Solving it for Vi (p; ) yields
Vi (p; ) = ki

1   ( ) ( ) 
1   (1   ( ))

(p  c)

D (p)  (K  K )
K 

= kiV (p; ) : (3)
Observe that rm is value equals a common value per unit of capacity, V (p; ),
multiplied by its capacity: Vi (p; ) = kiV (p; ). When the cartel is not all-inclusive,
non-cartel members optimally set their prices slightly below the cartel price and
produce up to their capacity. Since ki < D (pm) 8i 2 N (Assumption 3), this implies
that a member that undercuts the collusive price optimally prices at p  " or p  2".
Specically, it will choose p " when it is capacity constrained at that price; otherwise
it sets p  2". As to the latter, the cheating rm would be charging the lowest price
in the industry and is therefore capacity constrained by assumption. Consequently,
cutting price further would be unprotable. Thus, for " su¢ ciently small, a cheating
rm i 2   earns approximately (p  c) ki in terms of current prot and zero future
prot (as all rms revert to static Nash equilibrium pricing).12 Finally, recall that
there is still a chance of being caught in the period of defection so that cheating
members remain subject to antitrust enforcement. A deviating rm therefore also
has the possibility to simultaneously apply for leniency.13
Given a cartel  , the incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) for rm i 2   is
then 
1   ( ) ( ) 
1   (1   ( ))

(p  c)

D (p)  (K  K )
K 

ki
 (p  c) ki  min f ( ) ( ) ; g  (p  c)

D (p)  (K  K )
K 

ki:
Rearranging, the ICC can be presented as

 ( ) 

1   ( ) ( ) 
1   (1   ( ))

+min f ( ) ( ) ; g   K 
D (p)  (K  K ) : (4)
Note that the ICC is the same for all cartel members. Whether a cheating rm
nds it optimal to apply for leniency depends on the values of  ( ) ( ) and . A
deviating member nds it optimal to turn itself in (prior to any investigation) only
when leniency is su¢ ciently generous ( <  ( ) ( )) and otherwise prefers not to
self-report ( >  ( ) ( )).14
The cartels problem is to choose price to maximize cartel value per unit of ca-
pacity subject to the ICC:
12We conjecture that all results extend to when the cartel can be recreated in the future. For
example, if the cartel comes back together in T periods then
Vi (p; ) = ki
 
1   ( ) ( ) 
1   +     T   ( )
!
(p  c)

D (p)  (K  K )
K 

which is qualitatively similar to (3).
13This is referred to as the Deviator Amnesty e¤ect in Harrington (2008).
14Note that it is assumed a deviating rm pays a penalty proportional to its prot if it set the
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p ( ) = argmax

1   ( ) ( ) 
1   (1   ( ))

(p  c)

D (p)  (K  K )
K 

subject to

 ( )  K 
D (p)  (K  K ) :
Let bp ( ) be the maximum price that satises the ICC:
bp ( )  D 1 (K  K  + (K =
 ( ))) :
Hence, rms can only sustain a price above cost when
D 1 (K  K  + (K =
 ( ))) > c) 
 ( ) > K 
D (c)  (K  K ) :
This condition is guaranteed to hold when  ( ) ! 0 and  ! 1, provided that a
su¢ cient amount of industry capacity is under the control of the cartel. Since the
objective function is strictly concave,
@2V (p; )
@p2
=

1   ( ) ( ) 
1   (1   ( ))

2D0 (p) + (p  c)D00 (p)
K 

< 0;
the rst-order condition is su¢ cient to determine the non-binding solution. Let po ( )
denote the unconstrained optimal cartel price:
D (po ( ))  (K  K ) + (po ( )  c)D0 (po ( )) = 0: (5)
Observe that the unconstrained solution is independent of antitrust enforcement.
Finally, since V (p; ) is strictly concave in p, it follows that
p ( ) = min fbp ( ) ; po ( )g :
The equilibrium collusive value for a cartel   is then
V  ( )  V (p ( ) ; ) =

1   ( ) ( ) 
1   (1   ( ))

(p ( )  c)

D (p ( ))  (K  K )
K 

:
(6)
Prior to exploring the impact of antitrust enforcement on the inclusiveness of
cartels, it is useful to gain some insight into its impact on the collusive price. In
our previous work, the optimal cartel price was primarily determined by the amount
collusive price. If deviation occurred in the rst period of collusion, it would seem more reasonable
to assume that it is proportional to the prot it received while deviating. If deviation occurred after
many periods of collusion then the penalty ought to be proportional to average prot during the time
of the cartel which will be a weighted average of collusive prot (for the many periods of collusion)
and deviation prot (for the one period of deviation) which will be close to collusive prot. We chose
the latter specication since it describes the steady-state. However, we have no reason to think that
our main results are sensitive to this assumption.
7
of industry capacity controlled by the cartel, and the cartel price was shown to be
increasing in cartel capacity (Theorem 3 in Bos and Harrington, 2010). In the current
analysis, rms that take part in the collusive agreement incur expected penalties due
to antitrust enforcement. The presence of antitrust enforcement potentially creates
a trade-o¤ when it comes to the e¤ect of a more inclusive cartel on price. While a
more inclusive cartel means less capacity is outside of the cartel, which tends to raise
the collusive price, it also means higher expected penalties because the probability
of discovery and conviction is higher ( is higher) and a rm is less likely to receive
leniency ( is higher), which tends to lower the collusive price. With these two
counter-acting forces of a more inclusive cartel, its impact on price is ambiguous.
However, pertinent to the ensuing analysis, we can show that more intense antitrust
enforcement will tend to reduce the optimal cartel price by tightening the ICC. Thus,
for a given cartel, a stricter antitrust regime leads to a weakly lower cartel price.
Theorem 1 For any given cartel  , p ( ) is non-increasing in  ( ) ;  ( ), and .
If p ( ) < po ( ), then p ( ) is decreasing in  ( ) ;  ( ), and .
Proof. If the ICC is not binding, then p ( ) is independent of  ( ) ;  ( ), and .
If the ICC is binding, then p ( ) satises

 ( ) =
K 
D (p ( ))  (K  K ) (7)
where 
 ( ) is dened in (4). If  < ( ) ( ), then
@
 ( )
@ ( )
=  

 ( )  (1  ) + 
[1   (1   ( ))]2

< 0;
@
 ( )
@ ( )
=    ( ) 
1   (1   ( )) < 0;
@
 ( )
@
=  

 ( ) ( )   +  (1   ( ))
1   (1   ( ))

< 0:
If  > ( ) ( ), then
@
 ( )
@ ( )
=  

 ( )  (1   ( )) [1   (1   ( ))] +  (1   ( ) ( ) )
[1   (1   ( ))]2

< 0;
@
 ( )
@ ( )
=   (1   ( ))  ( ) 
1   (1   ( )) < 0;
@
 ( )
@
=   (1   ( ))  ( ) ( )
1   (1   ( )) < 0:
Given that 
 ( ) is decreasing in  ( ) ;  ( ), and ; then, at higher values for those
parameters, (7) implies

 ( ) <
K 
D (p ( ))  (K  K ) :
It follows that p ( ) must decline so that D (p ( )) is increased and K D(p( )) (K K )
is decreased in order to satisfy the ICC.
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Consistent with other work, more intense antitrust enforcement (weakly) reduces
the cartel price, holding the composition of the cartel xed. Previous research typi-
cally assumes the cartel is all-inclusive and is unresponsive to antitrust enforcement
(with the exception of when enforcement is increased so much that collusion is no
longer sustainable). The remainder of the analysis of this paper will explore how
antitrust enforcement a¤ects how inclusive is the cartel.
4 Dening the Set of Stable Cartels
Let us now direct our attention to cartel formation and identifying what coalition
congurations are stable. dAspremont et al (1983) were among the rst to provide a
clear and intuitive notion of cartel stability. A cartel is considered to be stable when
(i) none of its members wants to leave the cartel (internal stability) and (ii) none of
the non-cartel members wants to join the cartel (external stability).
To derive the exact conditions in our model for a cartel to be both internally and
externally stable, consider some candidate cartel  . The equilibrium value to rm
i is kiV  ( ) when i 2   and is [p
( ) c]ki
1 (1 ( )) when i =2  . Dene Wi ( ) to be the
equilibrium value to rm i when i 2   and it does not join the cartel, and when
i =2   and it joins the cartel. Wi ( ) is then the payo¤ that rm i expects if it acts
contrary to expectations about cartel membership, whether it means not joining the
cartel when it should have or joining the cartel when it should not have.15 With
these equilibrium values, a cartel is stable when all cartel members strictly prefer
to be a member (internal stability) and all non-members weakly prefer not to be a
member (external stability). Internal stability requires a strict preference for cartel
membership in order to rule out the trivial case in which rms are members of a
cartel but the cartel prices the same as when there is no cartel (that is, at cost).16
Denition 2 A cartel   is stable if: i) kiV  ( ) > Wi ( ) for all i 2   ; and ii)
[p( ) c]ki
1 (1 ( )) Wi ( ) for all i =2  :
In specifyingWi ( ) ; it is standard in the literature (including our earlier paper) to
assume that, regardless of rmsdecisions as to whether or not to join the cartel, the
resulting cartel acts according to the equilibrium yielding the highest collusive value.
While that is a natural specication when rms act according to expectations with
respect to the cartel membership decision, there could be other reasonable responses
15 In thinking about a rm joining a cartel for which it was not expected to be a member, the issue
is not whether a rm can force its way into a cartel but rather whether it desires to join a cartel for
which it was not expected to be a member. As it turns out, if the existing members of a cartel nd
it unprotable for an outsider to join then that outsider will nd it unprotable as well; thus, a rm
will never want to try and force itself on a cartel. The problematic situation is when a rm prefers
not to join a cartel and existing cartel members would like for it to join.
16This denition presumes that rms, in deciding whether to join or leave a cartel, take as given
the membership decisions of the other rms. That is, a rm that considers a change in membership
assumes that insiders remain insiders and outsiders remain outsiders. Relaxing this assumption,
albeit potentially interesting, would signicantly complicate the analysis. See Bos and Harrington
(2010) for a discussion of this issue.
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when rms do not act according to expectations, either by not joining a cartel for
which it was supposed to be a member or joining a cartel for which it was not
supposed to be a member. A novel feature of our approach is to consider various
equilibria in response to such events. One equilibrium is the standard specication:
the cartel accommodates the disequilibrium membership decision by achieving the
maximal level of collusion given whichever rms are in the cartel. We refer to this as
the accommodative equilibrium and it implies:
if i 2   then Wi ( ) = [p
 ( nfig)  c] ki
1   (1   ( nfig)) ;
and
if i =2   then Wi ( ) = kiV  (  [ fig) :
An alternative equilibrium is that the cartel responds in a punishing manner by
disbanding so that all rms receive the static Nash equilibrium payo¤. Referring to
it as the aggressive equilibrium, Wi ( ) = 0 8i. There are other equilibria one could
consider.
In performing an equilibrium selection, we are guided by the objective of this
paper which is to assess the e¤ect of antitrust enforcement on the range of stable
cartels. Hence, we will consider the most expansive set of cartels. Given that the
aggressive equilibrium is the equilibrium with the lowest payo¤s, if a cartel is not
stable with the aggressive equilibrium then it is not stable with any other equilibrium.
This then argues to specifying the aggressive equilibrium. However, one modication
to that specication is appropriate on plausibility grounds. It would seem nonsensical
for a cartel to punish a cartel member for departing or a non-cartel member for
joining when such an action actually improves the payo¤s of cartel members. Thus,
when entry into (exit from) the cartel enhances the value of the original (remaining)
members of the cartel, it is assumed that the accommodative equilibrium ensues.
This assumption is embodied in the following two conditions used in evaluating the
stability of cartel  . First,
if i =2   and V  (  [ fig) > V  ( ) then Wi ( ) = kiV  (  [ fig) ;
that is, if an outsider joining the cartel raises each original cartel members payo¤
under the supposition of the accommodative equilibrium then cartel members do in
fact respond with the accommodative equilibrium. Second,
if i 2   and V  ( n fig) > V  ( ) then Wi ( ) = [p
 ( nfig)  c] ki
1   (1   ( nfig)) ;
that is, if an insider leaving the cartel raises each remaining cartel members payo¤
under the supposition of the accommodative equilibrium then cartel members do in
fact respond with the accommodative equilibrium. For all other cases, cartel members
respond with the aggressive equilibrium so Wi ( ) = 0.
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5 Impact of a Competition Authority on the Set of Sta-
ble Cartels
First note that if antitrust enforcement is su¢ ciently strong then no cartels are stable
because collusion is ine¤ective at sustaining prices above the non-collusive price. That
is not the scenario examined here. Instead, we are considering when stable cartels still
exist and asking whether they tend to be larger or smaller compared to the absence
of antitrust enforcement. Given that there can be many stable cartels, the analysis
will focus on the impact on the range of cartel size.17 For this purpose, we dene:
Denition 3  0 is a minimal stable cartel if  0 is stable and   is not a stable
cartel for all     0:
Denition 4  0 is a maximal stable cartel if  0 is stable and   is not a stable
cartel for all     0:
A minimal stable cartel is a stable cartel for which there is no sub-coalition of that
cartel which is stable, while a maximal stable cartel is a stable cartel for which there
is no super-coalition containing that cartel which is stable. There can be multiple
minimal and maximal stable cartels.
The impact of antitrust enforcement on the size of maximal stable cartels is
examined in Section 5.1 and on the size of minimal stable cartels in Section 5.2.
Itll be shown that competition policy can reduce the size of the largest cartels but,
depending on the circumstances, can either increase or decrease the size of the smallest
cartels.
5.1 Maximal Cartel Size
The task is to compare the size of maximal stable cartels with and without antitrust
enforcement. As a benchmark, Lemma 5 shows that if collusion is sustainable in
the absence of a competition authority - for which  > K D(c)K is a necessary and
su¢ cient condition - then there is a unique maximal cartel and it is the all-inclusive
cartel.18
Lemma 5 Assume  > K D(c)K . In the absence of antitrust enforcement, the maxi-
mal stable cartel is the all-inclusive cartel.
Proof. Theorem 4 in Bos and Harrington (2010) shows that the cartel value without
antitrust enforcement, V ( ); is greater when the cartel is more inclusive: if  0   00
then V ( 00) > V ( 0). Consider the all-inclusive cartel:   = N . As there are no
outsiders, it is trivially externally stable. By assuming Wi ( ) = 0 - that is, an
17 It is common in these types of models that there can be multiple stable cartels; see, for example,
Donsimoni (1985), Donsimoni et al (1986) and Diamantoudi (2005).
18We did not necessarily nd the all-inclusive cartel to be stable in Bos and Harrington (2010)
because the accommodative equilibrium was used in assessing internal stability. Here, we assume
the aggressive equilibrium except where previously noted.
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insider who leaves the cartel can expect the static Nash equilibrium - it follows from
V (N) > 0 that it is internally stable. Therefore, N is stable in the absence of
antitrust enforcement.
It is an immediate corollary that antitrust enforcement cannot cause the largest
stable cartel to be more inclusive. Thus, the issue is whether it can cause the largest
stable cartel to contract. While the all-inclusive cartel generates the highest prots
without antitrust enforcement, this may no longer be true with an antitrust author-
ity because expected penalties are increasing in cartel size. While each additional
member to the cartel adds value for the original cartel members by restricting its
supply below its capacity, it also creates a cost to those original members by increas-
ing the probability of discovery and conviction (and perhaps reducing the chances
of an original member receiving leniency since now there will be more rms striving
for it). Given that the impact on the collusive price from a rm joining a cartel is
positively related to rm size - a larger rm brings more capacity under the control
of the cartel which means output is restricted more and price rises more - a su¢ -
ciently small rm may not raise the collusive price enough to o¤set having increased
expected penalties. As a result, a small rm earns higher prot outside of the cartel -
which is the case whether or not there is antitrust enforcement - and, in addition, the
remaining cartel members also earn higher prot when a small rm remains outside
of the cartel - which is only true when there is antitrust enforcement and is because
expected penalties are lower.
Theorem 6 In the presence of antitrust enforcement, 9k > 0 such that if kn < k
then a maximal stable cartel excludes rm n:
Proof. If p (N) = c then the theorem is true because N is not a stable cartel and
thus cannot be a maximal stable cartel. Thus, for the remainder of the proof, suppose
p (N) > c so that a collusive price can be sustained with the all-inclusive cartel. Let
us derive su¢ cient conditions for cartel N not to be stable.
The collusive value per unit of capacity for the all-inclusive cartel is
V  (N) =

1  (N) (N)
1  (1  (N))

(p (N)  c)

D(p (N))
K

(8)
and recall that the value to rm i is kiV  (N) : Let us contrast this with the collusive
value per unit of capacity for the cartel that excludes rm n. Letting   Nnfng
then
V  () =

1  () ()
1  (1  ())

(p ()  c)

D(p ())  kn
K   kn

(9)
which means a cartel member i 2  earns kiV  () : Comparing (9) with (8), the less
than all inclusive cartel  generates more value than the all-inclusive cartel when:
1  () ()
1  (1  ())

(p () c)

D(p ())  kn
K   kn

>

1  (N) (N)
1  (1  (N))

(p (N) c)

D(p (N))
K

:
12
Rearranging yields:
(p ()  c)

D(p()) kn
K kn

(p (N)  c)

D(p(N))
K
 > (1  (N) (N))(1  (1  ()))
(1  () ())(1  (1  (N))) : (10)
Consider the LHS as kn ! 0;
lim
kn!0
(p ()  c)

D(p()) kn
K kn

(p (N)  c)

D(p(N))
K
 = lim
kn!0
(p ()  c)D(p ())
(p (N)  c)D(p (N)) :
When  () = 0; limkn!0 p () = limkn!0 p (N) : By Theorem 1,  () > 0 implies
limkn!0 p ()  limkn!0 p (N) because, as kn ! 0, cartel N is equivalent to cartel
 but with  =  (N). Therefore, limkn!0(p ()  c)D(p ())  limkn!0(p (N) 
c)D(p (N)) which implies the LHS of (10) is at least one. Next consider the RHS of
(10). Re-arranging the expression, it is strictly less than one i¤
 [(N)  ()]+(1  )  [(N) (N)  () ()]+(N)() [ (N)   ()] > 0:
This condition holds because of A4 and A5: limkn!0 (N) > limkn!0 () and
 (N)   (): We have then shown that the rms in  earn a higher payo¤ when
rm n is not a member of the cartel, compared to when it is a member. By our
specication, this implies that if rm n departs from cartel N then the remaining
cartel members respond with the accommodative equilibrium.
The second step is to show that rm n prefers to depart from cartel N when the
accommodative equilibrium ensues in which case N is not internally stable. Firm ns
payo¤ in the cartel is
1  (N) (N)
1  (1  (N))

(p (N)  c)

D(p (N))
K

kn; (11)
and outside of the cartel is
(p ()  c)kn
1  (1  ()) : (12)
Given that
1
1  (1  ()) >
1  (N) (N)
1  (1  (N))
then (12) exceeds (11) if
(p ()  c)kn  (p (N)  c)

D(p (N))
K

kn
p ()  c  (p (N)  c)

D(p (N))
K

Given limkn!0 p ()  limkn!0 p (N) then this condition holds.
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In sum, as kn ! 0, cartel N is not stable because rm n nds it more protable
to be outside of the cartel assuming the cartel accommodates its departure and,
given the remaining cartel members are better o¤ with the departure, they do indeed
accommodate it.
We then nd that antitrust enforcement can result in less inclusive cartels because
the smallest rms may not be members. The next natural question to ask is: What
is the e¤ect on price from the cartel being made less inclusive because of the presence
of a competition authority? If the cartel can sustain the unconstrained collusive price
then excluding smaller rms must result in a lower price; the unconstrained collusive
price is independent of antitrust enforcement and is lower when the cartel controls
less capacity. However, when the collusive price is determined by the ICC, the e¤ect
of a less inclusive cartel on price is unclear. O¤setting the price-reducing e¤ect of the
cartel controlling less capacity, collusive value is higher which loosens the ICC and
could possibly allow for a higher collusive price. Sorting out those conicting forces
is a topic for future research.
Thus far weve shown that maximal cartels are less inclusive in the presence of
a competition authority. The basis for this result is that collusive value per unit of
capacity for cartel members is maximized by excluding the smallest rms. Building
on that nding, let us characterize how more intense enforcement - as reected in
a higher penalty multiple - impacts the characteristics of the most protable cartel.
For this purpose, dene an ordering  of cartels:  00   0 if and only if ( 00)  ( 0);
 ( 00)   ( 0); and K 00  K 0 and one of the inequalities is strict. Thus, cartels are
ranked according to the probability of paying penalties, penalty discount (which is
1   ), and capacity. Generally, less inclusive cartels will have a lower probability of
paying penalties, a higher discount, and lower capacity.19
Under the assumptions of full leniency and approximately linear demand, the next
result shows that, in response to more severe penalties, the cartel that maximizes
value per unit of cartel capacity is a cartel that is (weakly) "smaller" in the sense of
controlling less capacity, having a lower probability of paying penalties, and having
a higher discount on penalties.20
Theorem 7 Assume  = 0 and demand is approximately linear (D00 () ' 0). Dene
  () as the most protable stable cartel (in terms of value per unit of capacity). If
 is complete and 00 > 0 then (  (0))  (  (00));  (  (0))   (  (00)); and
K (0)  K (00); that is, in response to higher penalties, the most protable stable
cartel has a (weakly) lower probability of paying penalties, higher discount, and lower
capacity.
Proof. The proof strategy is to show that if  00   0 and V  ( 0; 0) > V  ( 00; 0)
(where we have made explicit the value for ) then V  ( 0; 00) > V  ( 00; 00) where
00 > 0: That is, if cartel  0 is more protable than cartel  00 and cartel  0 has a lower
19 If it is assumed all rms have equal capacity then this ordering is complete and cartels are ranked
according to the number of rms, j j.
20While we have no reason to believe that the result fails to hold when leniency is less than full
and demand is not linear, we have been unable to prove the result more generally.
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probability of paying penalties (( 00)  ( 0)), a higher discount ( ( 00)   ( 0));
and controls less capacity (K 00  K 0) then cartel  0 will continue to be more prof-
itable when penalties are higher. With that result, it can then be argued that the most
protable cartel must be "smaller" (in the sense of the ordering) when  is higher.
For suppose the most protable cartel when  = 0 is   (0): V  (  (0) ; 0) >
V  ( ; 0)8 . When  is increased to 00; it must then still be the case that   (0)
is more protable than "larger" cartels - V  (  (0) ; 00) > V  ( ; 00)8  such that
     (0) - which then implies that the most protable cartel must be (weakly)
"smaller" than   (0).
Using the expression for V  ( ) ; cartel  0 generates higher value (per unit of cartel
capacity) than  00 when
1  ( 0) ( 0)
1  (1  ( 0))

(p
 
 0
  c)D(p ( 0))  (K  K 0)
K 0

>

1  ( 00) ( 00)
1  (1  ( 00))

(p
 
 00
  c)D(p ( 00))  (K  K 00)
K 00

:
Re-arranging, we have
1  ( 0) ( 0)
1  (1  ( 0))

1  (1  ( 00))
1  ( 00) ( 00)

(13)
>

p ( 00)  c
p ( 0)  c

D(p ( 00))  (K  K 00)
D(p ( 0))  (K  K 0)

K 0
K 00

The task is to show that if (13) holds and ( 00)  ( 0);  ( 00)   ( 0); and K 00 
K 0 then (13) continues to hold when  is increased. This result will be shown for
two cases. First, when the collusive price is the unconstrained cartel price: p ( ) =
po ( ) : Second, when the collusive price is the constrained cartel price, p ( ) = bp ( ) ;
and there is full leniency ( = 0) and demand is approximately linear.21
Suppose the ICC is not binding at the collusive price, in which case the collusive
price p ( ) is dened by (5) and thus is independent of : Let us show that if (13)
holds and  ( 00)   ( 0) ;  ( 00)   ( 0) ; and K 00  K 0 then it continues to hold
when  is increased. Since the RHS of (13) is unchanged by increasing , we need
only show that raising  does not decrease the LHS of (13). Take the derivative of
the LHS of (13):
@
@
= f ( 0) ( 0) 1  (1  ( 00)) 1  (1  ( 0)) 1  ( 00) ( 00)
+

1  ( 0) ( 0) 1  (1  ( 00)) 1  (1  ( 0)) ( 00) ( 00)g 
1  (1  ( 0)) 1  ( 00) ( 00)	 2
21The di¢ culty in deriving a more general result in the second case is that changing  a¤ects the
ICC and thus a¤ects the collusive price, while that is not the case when the ICC is not binding.
While we conjecture the result is more general, a proof has thus far eluded us.
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Next note that:
sign

@
@

= sign
 ( 0) ( 0) 1  ( 00) ( 00)+ 1  ( 0) ( 0) ( 00) ( 00)	
= sign

( 00) ( 00)  ( 0) ( 0)	 :
Thus, if ( 00)  ( 0) and  ( 00)   ( 0) then sign
n
@
@
o
 0. Hence, when collusive
prices are unconstrained, if collusive value is higher with  0 than with  00; and  0
involves a weakly lower probability of paying penalties,  ( 00)   ( 0), and a weakly
higher discount on penalties,  ( 00)   ( 0), then collusive value is still higher with
 0 than with  00 after  is increased. Therefore, more severe penalties result in cartel
value being maximized by a cartel with a lower probability of conviction.
Now suppose collusive prices are determined by a binding ICC. p ( ) is then
dened by:

 ( ) 

1   ( ) ( ) 
1   (1   ( ))

+min f ( ) ( ) ; g  = K 
D(p ( ))  (K  K ) : (14)
Substituting (14) into V  ( ) from (6):
V  ( ) =

1   ( ) ( ) 
1   (1   ( ))

(p ( )  c)

D (p ( ))  (K  K )
K 

(15)
=

1  ( ) ( ) 
[1  (1   ( ))]
 ( )

(p ( )  c) :
It is not di¢ cult to show that V  ( ) is decreasing in ; that is, more severe penalties
lower the collusive value for any given cartel. However, what we want to show is: if
( 00)  ( 0);  ( 00)   ( 0); and K 00  K 0 (and one of them holds strictly) then
V  ( 0) is less sensitive to  than is V  ( 00) : That will then imply: if V  ( 0) > V  ( 00)
then, after  is increased, it is still the case that V  ( 0) > V  ( 00). Take the derivative
of (15) with respect to .
@V  ( )
@
=

1  ( ) ( ) 
[1  (1   ( ))]
 ( )

@p ( )
@
  (p ( )  c)

min f ( ) ( ) ; g
[1  (1   ( ))] (
 ( ))2

:
Re-arranging yields:
@V  ( )
@
=

1
[1  (1   ( ))] (
 ( ))2

 (16)
(1  ( ) ( ) ) 
 ( ) @p
 ( )
@
  (p ( )  c) (min f ( ) ( ) ; g)

:
Assume a full leniency program,  = 0; to simplify (16):
@V  ( )
@
=

1  (1   ( ))
(1  ( ) ( ) )2
"
(1  ( ) ( ) )2
1  (1   ( ))
@p ( )
@
#
=
@p ( )
@
: (17)
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Thus, the change in collusive value with respect to  just equals the change in collusive
price with respect to : By Theorem 1, @p
( )
@ < 0 and, therefore,
@V ( )
@ < 0; so higher
penalties reduce collusive value.
What we then need to show is: if ( 00)  ( 0);  ( 00)   ( 0); and K 00  K 0
(and one of them holds strictly) then V  ( 0) is less sensitive to  than is V  ( 00)
which, by (17), requires
(0 >)
@p ( 0)
@
>
@p ( 00)
@
:
Total di¤erentiating (14) with respect to ,
@p ( )
@
=
K 
h
( ) ( )
1 (1 ( ))

 min f ( ) ( ) ; g
i
D0 (p ( ))
h
1 ( ) ( )
1 (1 ( ))

+min f ( ) ( ) ; g 
i2 :
Setting  = 0;
@p ( )
@
=
K  ( ) ( ) (1   (1   ( )))
D0 (p ( )) (1   ( ) ( ) )2 :
Thus, @p
( 0)
@ >
@p( 00)
@ i¤
K 0 ( 
0) ( 0) (1   (1   ( 0)))
D0 (p ( 0)) (1   ( 0) ( 0) )2 >
K 00 ( 
00) ( 00) (1   (1   ( 00)))
D0 (p ( 00)) (1   ( 00) ( 00) )2 )
K 00 ( 
00) ( 00) (1   (1   ( 00)))
(1   ( 00) ( 00) )2 >

D0 (p ( 00))
D0 (p ( 0))

K 0 ( 
0) ( 0) (1   (1   ( 0)))
(1   ( 0) ( 0) )2

(18)
If demand is approximately linear - so D
0(p( 00))
D0(p( 0)) ' 1 - then (18) holds if
K 00

 ( 00) ( 00) (1   (1   ( 00)))
(1   ( 00) ( 00) )2

> K 0

 ( 0) ( 0) (1   (1   ( 0)))
(1   ( 0) ( 0) )2

(19)
Note that  (1 (1 ))
(1  )2 is increasing in  and  : Hence, if ( 
00)  ( 0);  ( 00) 
 ( 0); and K 00  K 0 (and one of them holds strictly) then (19) holds.
In sum, the introduction of a competition authority (weakly) reduces the inclu-
siveness of the most inclusive stable cartel. Without a competition authority, the
all-inclusive cartel is the most protable - in terms of value per unit of cartel capacity
- and it is stable because cartel members can threaten to dismantle the cartel if any
member leaves. However, when there is a competition authority, the most protable
cartel can be less than all-inclusive because additional members raise expected penal-
ties and this can exceed the benets from controlling more capacity. In particular,
the most inclusive stable cartel will exclude small rms. We also nd that more ag-
gressive enforcement in terms of higher penalties cause the most protable cartel to
control less capacity and have a lower probability of paying penalties. These ndings
are consistent with antitrust enforcement resulting in the most inclusive cartels being
less inclusive.
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5.2 Minimal Cartel Size
Next we turn to considering the smallest stable cartels. A cartel can be "not inclusive
enough" for stability for either of two reasons. First, it may not control enough
capacity to sustain any collusion; that is, the collusive price is just the static Nash
equilibrium price. In that case, the cartel is not internally stable. Second, it may not
be externally stable in that a non-member prefers to join because doing so su¢ ciently
raises the collusive price and the rise in the new members price-cost margin is enough
to o¤set it having lower output and becoming liable for penalties. Using these two
conditions, the analysis in this section shows that antitrust enforcement can either
make the smallest cartels more inclusive or less inclusive.
5.2.1 Minimal Cartel Size Rises
The next result provides conditions whereby the smallest cartels are at least as large
when there is antitrust enforcement. Specically, when some cartels are unstable
without antitrust enforcement then they are unstable with antitrust enforcement.
Hence, if  0 is a minimal stable cartel without an antitrust authority - which means
that sub-coalitions are unstable - then those sub-coalitions are still unstable when
there is an antitrust authority. If  0 is still stable in an environment with antitrust
enforcement then it remains a minimal stable cartel and, if it is no longer stable, then
a minimal stable cartel either strictly contains  0 or there is no minimal stable cartel
containing  0:
Theorem 8 In the absence of antitrust enforcement , assume  0 is a minimal stable
cartel and p ( ) = c for all     0. Then, in the presence of antitrust enforcement,
  is not stable for all     0:
Proof. Recall that, without antitrust enforcement, a necessary and su¢ cient condi-
tion for a cartel   to sustain a collusive price is
1
1   >
K 
D (c)  (K  K ) :
Hence, if
1
1   
K 
D (c)  (K  K ) : (20)
then p ( ) = c and cartel   is (trivially) internally unstable. As postulated for when
there is no antitrust enforcement, suppose  0 is a minimal stable cartel and p ( ) = c
for all     0 which means (20) holds. We want to show that, in the presence of
antitrust enforcement, the equivalent condition to (20) holds for all     0 which
means the minimal stable cartel is not a subset of  0.
With antitrust enforcement, the analogue to (20) is

 ( ) 

1   ( ) ( ) 
1   (1   ( ))

+min f ( ) ( ) ; g   K 
D (c)  (K  K ) : (21)
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To see that (20) implies (21), note that the RHSs are the same, whereas the LHS of
(21) is lower. As to the latter, if  ( ) ( )  , then we need
1   ( ( ) ( )  )  (1   ( ))
1   (1   ( )) 
1
1   ;
which holds. If  ( ) ( ) < , then we need
1  (1   ( )) ( ) ( ) 
1   (1   ( )) 
1
1   ;
which also holds. Hence, with antitrust enforcement, p ( ) = c and therefore   is
internally unstable for all     0.
In establishing that minimal stable cartel size may not fall with antitrust enforce-
ment, the previous theorem relied on p ( ) = c for all sub-coalitions of the minimal
stable cartel without antitrust enforcement. Well now show that a su¢ cient condi-
tion for that property to hold is that market demand is su¢ ciently inelastic. Recall
that, without an antitrust authority, p ( ) is dened by:
p ( ) = argmax

1
1  

(p  c)

D (p)  (K  K )
K 

subject to
1
1   
K 
D (p)  (K  K ) :
Assume market demand is perfectly inelastic: D (p) = Q0 for p  p (with p > c) and
D (p) = 0 for p > p. The above problem becomes
p ( ) = argmax

1
1  

(p  c)

Q0   (K  K )
K 

subject to
1
1   
K 
Q0   (K  K )
which implies p ( ) = p when 11   K Q0 (K K ) , and p ( ) = c when
1
1  <
K 
Q0 (K K ) : Let us then show that if p
 ( ) = p then   is stable which implies: if  0
is a minimal stable cartel then p ( ) = c for all     0: If p ( ) = p then rm i 2  
earns 
1
1  

(p  c)

Q0   (K  K )
K 

ki > 0
which implies internal stability when Wi ( ) = 0; that is, the aggressive equilibrium
ensues if a cartel member departs because such a departure reduces the collusive
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value for the remaining cartel members. If j =2   then, even if the accommodative
equilibrium ensues, it is externally stable because rm j earns
1
1  

(p  c) kj
outside of the cartel and earns
1
1  

(p  c)

Q0   (K  K    kj)
K  + kj

kj
by joining the cartel which is strictly smaller. Intuitively, a rm that joins the cartel
goes from producing at capacity to producing below capacity. Thus, a necessary
condition for it to nd it protable to join a cartel is that, by bringing more capacity
under the control of the cartel, the collusive price is higher. (Recall that both in-
siders and outsiders charge, approximately, the same price.) However, when market
demand is perfectly inelastic, expanding the cartel does not raise the collusive price.
By continuity, when market demand is su¢ ciently inelastic, a minimal stable cartel
without a competition authority will be a least inclusive cartel that is able to sustain
a collusive price, which is the condition specied in Theorem 8.
Continuing with the case of perfectly inelastic demand, we can provide su¢ cient
conditions for minimal cartel size to strictly expand in response to antitrust enforce-
ment. With antitrust enforcement, the ICC with perfectly inelastic market demand
takes the form:
1   ( ) ( ) 
1   (1   ( ))

+min f ( ) ( ) ; g   K 
Q0   (K  K ) :
Once again, if rms are able to collude then the collusive price is p. Therefore, a
minimal stable cartel is a least inclusive cartel that sustains p. Thus, if
1
1   
K 0
Q0   (K  K 0) >

1   ( 0) ( 0) 
1   (1   ( 0))

+min


 
 0

 
 
 0

; 
	
 (22)
then cartel  0 can e¤ectively collude in the absence of antitrust enforcement but
cannot do so in the presence of antitrust enforcement.22 Therefore, minimal stable
cartel size must rise in response to antitrust enforcement (at least when the expected
antitrust penalty is not increasing too much in cartel size).23
22To see how (22) may hold, suppose  = 0. Given that
1
1   >

1   ( 0) ( 0) 
1   (1   ( 0))

is true - and the RHS of the preceding inequality is the RHS of (22) when  = 0 - then there exists
values for K 0
Q0 (K K 0)
such that (22) is true.
23 It is possible that there does not exist a minimal stable cartel - which is surely the case if the
competition policy parameters are su¢ ciently high - but it is easy to nd intermediate values such
that these inequalities hold and there still exist more inclusive cartels that are able to collude. A
general set of conditions for that to be true are available.
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In sum, when market demand is su¢ ciently inelastic, a minimal stable cartel is
the smallest cartel for which a collusive price can be sustained. By tightening the
ICC, those cartels that could not sustain a collusive price, still cannot do so with
antitrust enforcement. Hence, cartels cannot be less inclusive and, furthermore, may
have to be more inclusive. Note that highly inelastic market demand may plausibly
hold for cartels that sell an input to industrial buyers where the input makes up a
small part of the cost of producing the industrial buyers product.24 In a market
with highly inelastic market demand in which the cartel is minimally inclusive, it is
then predicted that antitrust enforcement would cause a cartel to make itself more
inclusive in order to be able to e¤ectively collude.
5.2.2 Minimal Cartel Size Falls
The next result presumes the condition in Theorem 8 does not hold. In that case,
it is possible that antitrust enforcement reduces the size of a minimal stable cartel.
Specically, consider a cartel that was not externally stable in the absence of antitrust
enforcement because a rm outside of the cartel found it protable to join because
it would signicantly increase the collusive price. That same cartel may now be
externally stable when there is antitrust enforcement. If the addition of that rm
su¢ ciently increases the likelihood of detection then it is no longer protable to join.
As long as the cartel can still sustain a collusive price, it is also internally stable.
Theorem 9 In the absence of antitrust enforcement , assume  0 is a minimal stable
cartel and p ( 00) > c for some  00   0. Then, in the presence of antitrust en-
forcement, there exist  () such that  00 is stable; hence, it is a subset of  0 that is a
minimal stable cartel.
Proof. In the absence of antitrust enforcement, suppose  0 is a stable cartel,  00
is not a stable cartel where  00   0, and p ( 00) > c: Note that, in the absence of
antitrust enforcement, internal stability of  00 is satised by specifying the aggressive
equilibrium when a cartel member fails to join. Thus, if  00 is not stable, it is because it
is not externally stable. Now suppose there is antitrust enforcement and let  ( 00) = 
and min f ( 00 [ fjg) : j =2  00g = ; that is,  is the smallest probability of conviction
that results from an outsider joining  00. By continuity with the case of no antitrust
enforcement, if  ' 0 then  00 is internally stable. By setting  ' 1,  00 is externally
stable because another rm joining the cartel is unprotable due to the high rate of
conviction making it very likely the cartel will shut down.25
An issue is what are su¢ cient conditions for the condition in Theorem 9 to hold.
That is, one needs to show that, in the absence of antitrust enforcement, there exists
24For example, consider the lysine cartel (Connor, 2001). Lysine is used to build tissue in hogs
and is a very small part of the cost of producing hogs. Thus, the price of lysine could signicantly
increase without much of a change in the demand for hogs and thus without much of a change in the
derived market demand for lysine.
25That the penalty multiple, , does not matter is because cartel shutdown is forever. If instead
the cartel was allowed to reform then the same theorem would be true but, in addition to  ' 1, we
would need  to be su¢ ciently high so that expected penalties are su¢ ciently high.
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 0 such that: 1)  0 is stable; 2) 8    0;   is unstable (so that  0 is a minimal
stable cartel); and 3) 9    0 such that p ( ) > c: There must then be cartels that
are internally stable (that is, able to sustain a collusive price) but are not externally
stable because a rm would want to join for the purpose of su¢ ciently raising price.
Here we o¤er some su¢ cient conditions. Assume  ' 1 so that, without antitrust
enforcement, the collusive price is the unconstrained price. Assuming D(p) = 1  p,
it is shown in the Appendix that cartel   is internally stable (that is, p( ) > c) if
and only if K  > K   1 + c; and is externally stable (that is, an outsider does not
increase its prot by joining) if and only if
kj 
q
K2    (K   1 + c)2;8j =2  :
Firm j does not want to join if it is su¢ ciently small which makes sense since joining
will not have much of an impact on the collusive price - given that non-cartel capacity
has not fallen that much - but will have a proportionally large e¤ect on rm js
supply. Consider cartels comprising the largest rms:   (m)  f1; :::;mg ; where
recall k1      kn. There exists cartels satisfying the property in Theorem 9 if
there exists h such that:
k1 +   + kh 1  K   1 + c < k1 +   + kh <
q
k2h+1 + (K   1 + c)2:
The rst two inequalities mean that cartel   (h) is the smallest cartel that is able
to sustain a collusive price, and the third inequality means that the cartel is not
externally stable because rm h+ 1 wants to join it.
5.3 Discussion
Based upon the preceding analysis, let us draw out some general insight regarding
how the introduction of a competition authority a¤ects the set of stable cartels.
Recall that a cartel is stable when it is internally stable - which means rms are able
to sustain a collusive price and no member earns more prot by leaving the cartel -
and it is externally stable - which means no outsider to the cartel would earn higher
prot by joining the cartel.
External stability requires that a rm prefers not to join the cartel. Without
antitrust enforcement, the rationale for joining is that it raises the collusive price - by
bringing more capacity under the control of the cartel - but at the cost that the rm
must then constrain its supply below capacity. With antitrust enforcement, there
is an additional cost of joining which is that the rm that joins now becomes liable
for penalties. Given the associated reduction in prot from becoming a cartel mem-
ber, it would seem to make it more likely that any cartel satises external stability.
Furthermore, adding a rm can raise expected penalties - by, for example, making
discovery of the cartel more likely - which will lower collusive value and (weakly)
lower the collusive price by tightening the ICC. Thus, price may not rise as much
with the addition of this rm, compared to when there is no competition author-
ity. As a result, cartels that were externally stable without antitrust enforcement
are probably externally stable with antitrust enforcement. The impact on cartel size
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is then in terms of making previously (externally) unstable cartels now (externally)
stable. Specically, in the absence of antitrust enforcement, a relatively small cartel
may have been unstable because it was externally unstable; that is, a rm wanted to
join in order to expand cartel capacity and raise the collusive price. Now that there is
antitrust enforcement, the prospect of becoming liable for penalties may discourage
that rm from joining in which case that small cartel is now externally stable. In
sum, it would seem that antitrust enforcement augments external stability - rms are
less inclined to join a cartel - and this may result in smaller cartels now being stable.
Turning to internal stability, it requires, rst, that the cartel has enough capacity
so that a collusive price can be sustained, and, second, that the cartel value does not
rise in response to a member leaving. The latter condition implies that the remain-
ing cartel members would accommodate the exit and, given that accommodation,
the exiting rm would earn more prot outside of the cartel. Based on the preceding
analysis, we conjecture that the presence of a competition authority makes it less
likely that a cartel will satisfy internal stability. We know that enforcement (weakly)
reduces the collusive price by tightening the ICC. Thus, it could cause a cartel to lose
the ability to sustain a collusive price and thus cause the cartel to be internally unsta-
ble. To successfully collude, the cartel may then need to be more inclusive in order to
control more capacity (though this does depend on the rise in expected penalties from
greater inclusion not being so large as to counteract that e¤ect). Hence, antitrust en-
forcement may result in smaller cartels becoming larger in order to sustain a collusive
price. For the most inclusive cartels, antitrust enforcement may undermine internal
stability for a very di¤erent reason. A rm contributes to cartel value by having the
cartel control more capacity which then allows it to raise the collusive price but, at
the same time, it detracts from cartel value by increasing the probability of discovery
and, more generally, raising expected penalties. Thus, antitrust enforcement could
result in cartel value being enhanced by a rm leaving the cartel (which also implies
the rm nds it protable to leave) which makes the cartel internally unstable. This
force means that antitrust enforcement will tend to reduce the size of large cartels.
It then appears that antitrust enforcement undermines internal stability which can
cause the smallest cartels to be larger and the largest cartels to be smaller. Hence,
the range of stable cartels shrinks.
In sum, our analysis suggests that antitrust enforcement makes it less di¢ cult to
satisfy external stability - outsiders to a cartel are more inclined not to participate -
but makes it more di¢ cult to satisfy internal stability - insiders to a cartel are more
inclined not to participate. As just described, these forces make for less inclusive
stable cartels. However, there is an additional way in which antitrust enforcement
internally destabilizes a cartel which is that it prevents the cartel from being able to
sustain a collusive price. In that case, cartel stability may require a more inclusive
cartel.
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6 Concluding Remarks
This paper is an initial foray into how competition policy impacts the inclusiveness of
cartels. We found that the presence of antitrust enforcement causes the most inclusive
stable cartels to be less inclusive and, in particular, small rms that might have been
cartel members in the absence of a competition authority are no longer members.
Regarding the least inclusive stable cartels, the presence of antitrust enforcement
can either increase or decrease their inclusiveness, depending on market conditions.
When market demand is highly inelastic, it will cause the least inclusive stable cartels
to encompass more rms in order to be able to sustain a collusive price.
A next step in this analysis is to examine the impact of competition policy on
price when the size and composition of the cartel is endogenized. Previous research on
how competition policy impacts price has presumed the cartel is all-inclusive and the
all-inclusivity is una¤ected by competition policy. However, competition policy can
have an indirect e¤ect on price through its impact on which rms join the cartel. Our
analysis suggests that such indirect e¤ects could be important. From a tractability
perspective, conducting such an analysis will probably necessitate more structure
than is assumed in this paper and may ultimately require numerical analysis.
Another potentially interesting extension of our analysis would be to allow car-
tels to use exclusionary tactics to restrain the supply of non-cartel members. The
current analysis presumes that non-cartel members do not restrain their supply in
that they price just below the cartels price and produce up to capacity. This is ob-
viously detrimental to the cartel and, in practice, some cartels have augmented their
collusive price-setting with exclusionary activities intended to constrain the supply
of non-cartel members. For example, in the district heating pipes cartel, the Swedish
rm Powerpipe did not join the cartel and eventually complained to the European
Commission that there was a cartel and it was acting in a predatory manner against
it.26 The use of exclusionary activities also explains why non-cartel members are a
common source of discovery of cartels. Hay and Kelley (1974) found that 12 out of
49 U.S. Department of Justice cases were discovered by means of a "complaint by
a competitor" and was the second most common source of detection. This discus-
sion raises two interesting issues. First, a partially inclusive cartel could be made
more protable by engaging in exclusionary activities against non-cartel members so
as to reduce non-cartel supply, but doing so runs the risk of those non-cartel mem-
bers complaining and the cartel being discovered. Encompassing those factors in
our model could produce some new insight into both the structure of cartels and
the properties of collusive practices. Second, it identies a complementarity between
competition laws. The law against price-xing (Section 1 of the Sherman Ac in the
U.S. and Article 101 TFEU in the EU) may be easier to enforce by virtue of the
law against exclusionary practices (Section 2 of the Sherman Act in the U.S. and
Article 102 TFEU in the EU). If some cartels are not all-inclusive - as the evidence
and our analysis suggests is likely - then laws against exclusionary practices provide
26This example, and other ones, can be found in Harrington (2006) and Marshall, Marx, and
Samkharadze (2011).
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a stronger incentive for non-cartel members to complain and a weaker incentive for
cartel members to engage in such activities, which will tend to make collusion less
protable and impact the inclusiveness of cartels.
7 Appendix: Proof of Conditions for the Property in
Theorem 9 to Hold
In Theorem 9, we have shown that antitrust enforcement may reduce minimal cartel
size. A key requirement for this to occur is that, in the absence of antitrust en-
forcement, there exists some subset of a minimal cartel that is able to sustain a price
above costs. If this requirement is not met, then we know by Theorem 8 that antitrust
enforcement will not lead to smaller minimal cartels. This raises the issue of when
without antitrust enforcement there exists a cartel   such that: 1)   is stable, 2)  0
is unstable for all  0    and 3) there exists a cartel  0    for which p ( 0) > c. In
the following, we present su¢ cient conditions for this property to hold.
 Step 1: Derive conditions under which a cartel   is stable.
To begin, assume that D(p) = 1   p and  ' 1. Thus, for a given cartel  , the
ICC is not binding. In this case, the optimal cartel price is given by
p ( ) =
1 K +K  + c
2
:
For   to be internally stable through the aggressive equilibrium it must hold that
p( ) > c, which requires
K  >
K  D(c)

' K   1 + c:
This cartel is externally stable when none of the outsiders nds it protable to join,
which is the case when

1
1  

[p ( )  c] kj 

1
1  

[p (  [ fjg)  c]

1  p (  [ fjg)  (K  K    kj)
K  + kj

kj ;8j =2  ;
or
p ( )  c  [p (  [ fjg)  c]

1  p (  [ fjg)  (K  K    kj)
K  + kj

;8j =2  :
By using
p (  [ fjg) = 1 K +K  + kj + c
2
;
the external stability condition reduces to
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(K  + kj) [p
 ( )  c]  (p (  [ fjg)  c)2 ;8j =2  :
Substituting p ( ) = 1 K+K +c2 and p
 (  [ fjg) = 1 K+K +kj+c2 and rearranging
gives
K  
q
k2j + (K   1 + c)2 ,
q
K2    (K   1 + c)2  kj ;8j =2  ;
which implies K  > K   1 + c. We therefore conclude that a cartel   is stable when
the following condition holds:
K  
q
k2j + (K   1 + c)2;8j =2  :
 Step 2: Derive conditions under which the cartel is minimally stable.
Let us now show when  0 is unstable for all  0   . Towards that end, consider
cartels that involve the largest rms:   (m)  f1; :::;mg and dene h by
k1 +   + kh 1  K   1 + c < k1 +   + kh:
Thus, p (  (h)) > c and p (  (m)) = c, 8m < h: Cartel   (h) is therefore the smallest
cartel for which a price above cost is sustainable. Observe that there always exists a
h for which this condition is satised since for h = 2 we have k1  K   1 + c, which
holds by assumption and for h = n we have K   1 + c < k1 +   + kn , 1  c > 0,
which again holds by assumption.
Next, suppose there exists r satisfying:
k1 +   + kr 1 <
q
k2r + (K   1 + c)2;
and q
k2r+1 + (K   1 + c)2  k1 +   + kr:
We show below that such an r exists and is unique. Now consider a cartel   (m)
for which m < r . Such a cartel is unstable because: 1) If m 2 fh; :::; r   1g, then
it is internally stable through the aggressive equilibrium, but externally unstable as
rm m + 1 wants to join; and 2) If m 2 f2; :::; h  1g, then it is internally unstable
as p (  (m)) = c. By contrast, the cartel   (r) is stable because: 1) it is internally
stable since k1 +   + kr 
q
k2r+1 + (K   1 + c)2 implies k1 +   + kr > K   1 + c
and thus p (  (r)) > c; and 2) it is externally stable because rm r+1 prefers not to
join. In turn, this implies that rm s prefers not to join 8s > r + 1: That is, if rm
r + 1 does not want to join the cartel containing the r largest rms, then all smaller
rms do not want to join either.
As a nal step, let us show that   (r) is not only stable, but also minimally stable.
We know that
k1 +   + kr 1 <
q
k2r + (K   1 + c)2:
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So, the cartel   (r   1) is not externally stable. Next consider any      (r). If
p ( ) = c, then   is not internally stable. If p ( ) > c, then it is internally stable,
but not externally stable because
k1 +   + kr 1 <
q
k2r + (K   1 + c)2 (23)
implies X
j2 
kj <
q
k2i + (K   1 + c)2 for i =2   and i  r: (24)
This is true, because k1+   +kr 1 
P
j2  kj . Therefore, the LHS of (24) is smaller
than the LHS of (23) and the RHS of (24) is weakly larger than the RHS of (23).
Hence, rm i =2   would choose to join  , which means that all      (r) are unstable.
The cartel   (r) is therefore not only stable, but also minimally stable.
 Step 3: Derive conditions under which a subset of   (r) can sustain
a collusive price.
What remains is to nd m such that r > m  h. That is, there are subsets of the
minimal stable cartel   (r) that have su¢ cient capacity to support a collusive price.
For such a subset it must hold that
K   1 + c < k1 +   + km <
q
k2m+1 + (K   1 + c)2:
Note that if this condition is not satised for m = h; so thatq
k2h+1 + (K   1 + c)2  k1 +   + kh;
then it does not hold for any m > h (as the RHS is increasing in m and the LHS
is non-increasing in m). Thus, the necessary and su¢ cient condition is that 9h such
that:
k1 +   + kh 1  K   1 + c < k1 +   + kh <
q
k2h+1 + (K   1 + c)2:
This means that the smallest cartel that is able to sustain a collusive price (cartel
  (h)) needs to be externally unstable.
To conclude, let us show that r exists and is unique. Dene r by
 (r   1) < 0   (r) ;
and let
 (m)  k1 +   + km  
q
k2m+1 + (K   1 + c)2:
Note that  (m) is strictly increasing in m. Hence, if  (1) < 0 <  (n), then there
exists a unique r such that:  (r   1) < 0   (r). For  (1) < 0, it must hold that
k1  
q
k22 + (K   1 + c)2 < 0:
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This inequality is satised whenq
(K   1 + c)2 > k1 , K   k1 > 1  c;
which is true by assumption. For  (n) > 0, it must hold that
K  
q
(K   1 + c)2 > 0, 1  c > 0;
which too holds by assumption. Thus, there exists a unique r such that  (r   1) <
0   (r).
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